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Humanists, I take it, value people, and are willing to
weigh their suggestions and beliefs, giving some po-
tential credence to any, as yet unfamiliar, belief, just
from the fact that some people hold to it.
So, as a humanist, I may consider Platonism, formal-
ism and constructivism, all views of mathematics
which are held by thoughtful and scholarly people.
My mathematical instinct to mark these views cor-
rect or mistaken should perhaps be held in check, since
I am looking not at mathematical propositions, but at
perspectives, views and beliefs. These perspectives
may be valid at different times of the day!
My day begins with teaching. In the classroom there
are pupils and myself. Here I am a constructivist. My
pupils have come to learn mathematics. I am here to
speak, to question, to write and act in such a way that
as much mathematical thinking and knowing goes on
as possible. I may exaggerate, tell jokes, deviate from
a deductive sequence, perform a drama or an experi-
ment, whatever, so long as these contribute to the
pupils’ construction of mathematics. Whatever mis-
takes they make afterwards are in some degree my
responsibility, reflecting the emphasis or lack of em-
phasis I have generated.
When the lesson is over I return to my office and try
reading about the history of the mathematics I have
just taught. I would like to be a constuctivist in this
mode too, but the secondary history texts tend to fo-
cus on the achievements of past mathematicians, not
upon the process by which those achievements were
attained, and I am regularly frustrated.
I turn then to my research on when a binary opera-
tion has the left inverse property that ab = 1 => a(bc) =
c, a weak form of the associative law. I look through a
catalogue of loops of order 6. Very few of these ob-
jects relate to other parts of mathematics. For the most
part I seem to be indulging in a “meaningless game
played with meaningless marks on paper” (Hilbert)
and confirming the formalist stance. The theorems that
emerge may become useful at some time in the future,
but the satisfaction I have now does not depend on
that. But I am a geometer and owe so much to Hil-
bert. His replacement of “points, lines and planes” by
“tables, chairs and beer mats” was the psychological
device that let him identify unstated assumptions in
our geometrical language and produce his Foundations
of Geometry (1899). Formalism can be both useful and
functional.
Now I am a grandparent, and watch grandchildren
acquiring language. I see the beginnings of counting
not with the comparison of sets, but with the recita-
tion of an almost senseless rhyme:
One, two, three four five,
Once I caught a fish alive.
Six, seven, eight nine ten,
Then I let it go again.
Just getting used to this sequence of sounds provides
the equipment for future mathematics. Formalism
seems to be part of the story from a very early age!
I wonder sometimes what is going on when I sub-
tract, say, two 4-digit numbers. There is a routine,
which has become second nature, a process which I
apply. If the process is to be effective it is best not to
relapse into thinking what it means.
After the research interval I go to the coffee room and
meet non-mathematical colleagues. The post-modern-
ists are curious about mathematics. I tell them it is
fashionable to knock Platonism these days, and they
respond by asking whether there are historically or
anthropologically inconsistent versions of mathemat-
ics available. I tell them that each of the versions of
mathematics I am aware of can be understood as con-
taining or being contained in some other version, and
they return to their work having convinced themselves
that the subject is absolute. Then I reflect back to my
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own research: yes, proofs I have invented, but the
patterns which the proofs legitimate seem to have been
there, waiting to be found. I have no idea what abso-
lute reality is like, but I can tell you what it felt like to
find these things.
And, so, back to Plato and his cave; the firelight cast-
ing shadows on the wall. We face the wall, and guess,
if we will, what makes the shadows. Sometimes math-
ematics seems firm, unshadowlike. But sometimes the
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shadows waver. In Proofs and Refutations, Lakatos
(1976) documents the wavering which may take place.
He says we never know whether our proofs are right,
but he believes we can be sure of their improvement.
And what of Gödel? Undecidability promises that we
will never come to the end of our search, because the
choice amongst the undecidables will remain, and the
absence of a consistency proof is the guarantee that
shadows, not ultimates, are what we see. I think I am
a Platonist at night.
